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IS IT FAIR TO CRIMINALIZE POSSESSION OF 
FIREARMS BY EX-FELONS? 
ZACK THOMPSON∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Steven Gomez was being held in the county jail when he learned that 
he had been acquitted of the charges against him.1 Upon hearing that 
Gomez would be released shortly, Imran Mir, a fellow inmate who had 
been charged with participating in an international drug conspiracy, 
offered Gomez $10,000 per person to kill the six witnesses who were 
going to testify against Mir.2 Gomez reported Mir’s offer to the jail guards. 
Eventually, the customs agent working on Mir’s case promised anonymity 
and protection to Gomez in return for his help in gathering evidence 
against Mir.3 Gomez then pretended to accept Mir’s offer and, over the 
next three months, received detailed information about each targeted 
witness, was promised weapons to carry out the killings, and received a 
cash down payment from Mir.4 But, when the government charged Mir 
with solicitation to commit murder, the Assistant United States Attorney 
disclosed Gomez’s full name in the indictment.5  
Shortly after he was released, Gomez was accosted by a man with a 
gun who accused Gomez of cooperating with law enforcement and 
insinuated that there was a contract out on Gomez’s life.6 The federal 
agents, the county sheriff, and Gomez’s parole officer all refused to take 
Gomez into protective custody.7 Gomez then started running for his life, 
sleeping at friends’ houses and living on the streets.8 After receiving death 
threats in several locations and not knowing what else to do, Gomez took 
possession of a twelve-gauge shotgun that had been stored at a friend’s 
house even though he was generally prohibited from possessing a firearm 
under federal law due to a prior felony conviction.9 Federal agents later 
sought to make contact with Gomez, not to belatedly offer him protection, 
 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate (2017), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 772–73. 
 5. Id. at 773. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 773–74. 
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but to get further help in making their case against Mir.10 After two days 
of searching, they found him at a friend’s house, carrying the shotgun.11 
Gomez was later indicted on two counts of being a felon in possession 
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),12 one count for the 
shotgun, the other for the shells in it.13 Given his dire situation and the 
government’s refusal to protect him, Gomez sought to introduce evidence 
tending to prove that his possession of the shotgun was justified, but the 
district court refused to allow this affirmative defense.14 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Gomez, the court found that Gomez’s situation fit within the 
very narrow justification exception to the federal felon-in-possession 
statute.15 Therefore, Gomez should have been allowed to present his 
justification defense to the jury.16  
Gomez’s case neatly lays out some of the costs and benefits of 
prohibiting ex-felons from possessing firearms, and the sympathetic 
defendant helps create an objective perspective and dispel some biases that 
easily cloud the issue of whether ex felons should be able to arm 
themselves. This Note will attempt to objectively tally up the ways that 
prohibiting ex-felons from possessing firearms both helps and harms 
members of society, using data to support arguments wherever possible. 
Data are not available on topics such as where ex-felons reside, their 
 
 
 10. Id. at 773. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in part: “It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been 
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to 
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
 13. Id. at 774. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 775–78. The Ninth Circuit found that if Gomez’s evidence were believed, it would be 
sufficient to meet the four elements of a justification defense under § 922(g): “(1) he was under 
unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) he did not recklessly place himself in 
a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) he had no reasonable legal 
alternative; and (4) there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm.” Id. at 775, 778. The government contested each of the elements on 
appeal, particularly whether the encounter and death threats created a “present threat of death” when 
the most recent death threat had been made two days prior. See id. at 775–78. The court held that, 
because Gomez was threatened by Mir, who was “deeply involved in the exportation of illegal 
substances,” who had large amounts of money and his freedom at stake, and who was already planning 
to murder witnesses against him, it was reasonable for Gomez to believe that he was still under 
immediate threat two days after the latest death threat was made. Id. at 776.  
 16. Gomez had already served most of his sentence by the time his appeal was decided, and it 
“appear[ed] unlikely that he could be retried before his sentence expire[d].” Id. at 778. The court 
therefore vacated his conviction and remanded “with directions that the district court release him 
immediately, subject only to appropriate conditions to ensure his availability in case of retrial.” Id. 
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experiences as victims of crime, or their perpetration of violent crimes, so 
the arguments presented here will necessarily only paint a partial picture. 
Part II sets forth some philosophical and legal background. Part III 
examines reasons why ex-felons legally possessing firearms could produce 
negative utility for society and digs deeper into the arguments and data 
offered to question the “common sense” that often underlies such 
positions. Part IV then considers reasons why ex-felons legally possessing 
firearms could produce positive utility for members of society. Part V will 
attempt to weigh the costs and benefits to determine net utility. In each 
part, the State of Missouri and the City of St. Louis will be used as case 
studies, wherever sufficient data are available, supplemented by national 
data when useful to fill in gaps. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Despite the apparent unfairness and injustice of the government’s 
treatment of Steven Gomez,17 he was lucky to prevail on appeal.18 Those 
circuits that have permitted a justification defense to the federal felon-in-
possession statute have construed the exception very narrowly.19 If, 
 
 
 17. See Gomez, 92 F.3d 770 at 778 & n.13 (“That Gomez approached the government with the 
information which formed the basis of Mir’s wrath against him, and did so without compulsion or 
hope of remuneration, speaks well for Gomez and not nearly so well for those in the government who 
betrayed his trust. To prosecute Gomez for trying to protect himself, when the government refused to 
protect him from the consequences of its own indiscretion, is not what we would expect from a fair-
minded sovereign. . . . The government quibbles that it never promised Gomez confidentiality as a 
condition for his cooperation. At this stage we must, of course, accept Gomez’s version of the events 
but, as a matter of fairness and justice, we don’t see why it matters. Let’s say Gomez lacked the 
foresight to extract a promise of confidentiality from the government before disclosing his information 
and helping it obtain more. Does the government then have no moral obligation to avoid unnecessary 
harm to one of its citizens, particularly one who has stepped forward to help prevent harm to others?”). 
 18. His sentence was vacated, but not before he had served all but two months of the sentence. 
See id. at 778. 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Because Congress, in 
enacting § 922(g), ‘sought to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they 
may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society,’ we ‘construe the 
justification defense for possession of a firearm by a felon very narrowly.’ Indeed, we reserve its 
application for the ‘rarest of occasions.’”) (first quoting Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 398 
(2005); then quoting United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 875 (4th Cir. 1995)); United States v. 
Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The restrictive approach is sound. Congress wrote section 
922(g) in absolute terms, banning any possession of firearms by all convicted felons. To ensure that 
this strict prohibition is effectuated, we should require that the defendant meet a high level of proof to 
establish the defense of justification.”); cf. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006) (“Congress 
can, if it chooses, enact a duress defense that places the burden on the Government to disprove duress 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of Congress’ silence on the issue, however, it is up to the federal 
courts to effectuate the affirmative defense of duress as Congress ‘may have contemplated’ it in an 
offense-specific context. In the context of the firearms offenses at issue—as will usually be the case, 
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instead, Gomez had been shot at while walking home from work eight 
months prior,20 had been attempting to protect his business after a series of 
recent robbery attempts,21 or had overheard a death threat only four hours 
earlier from a person who had already robbed and shot him one year 
prior,22 Gomez would likely have lost his fight to use the justification 
defense. In each of these situations, despite an ex-felon having a strong 
case that possession of a firearm is justified under notions of fairness and 
natural law,23 courts have found that such possession cannot be legally 
justified under the narrow exception to the federal felon-in-possession 
law.24  
A. Natural Law and Self-Preservation 
Thomas Hobbes described the “Right of Nature” as “the Liberty each 
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation 
of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of 
doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall 
 
 
given the long-established common-law rule--we presume that Congress intended the petitioner to bear 
the burden of proving the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citation omitted).  
 20. See State v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329–30 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Ragib, whose work as a free-
lance photographer requires him to attend evening social events, was shot while returning home late in 
the evening on July 5, 1987. Prior to his shooting, Ragib’s wife received several death threats over the 
telephone. Ragib testified that he purchased and carried the .357 revolver solely to protect himself 
against the possibility of another shooting. . . . While his fear of another attack may have been rational 
and might have been his real motivation for carrying a revolver, generalized fears will not support the 
defense of justification.”). 
 21. See United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117–18. (5th Cir. 1986) (“Harper contends that he 
purchased the gun mentioned in count 2 of the indictment from a pawnshop for the purpose of 
protecting himself and his fiancee at his business, which had been the object of several robbery 
attempts between April 1984 and September 1985. . . . There was no evidence that he was in danger of 
imminent bodily harm at the moment he purchased and possessed the gun; therefore, Harper is not 
entitled to the protection of the defense.”). 
 22. See United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Crediting his testimony, it is 
difficult to second guess or to ignore Alston’s fear of Bentley, one of the persons who robbed and shot 
him five times, and against whom he pressed charges that eventually resulted in an acquittal, and who 
apparently lived in sufficient proximity that total avoidance was impossible or at least unlikely. . . . 
Although Alston may have been under an unlawful threat of death or serious bodily injury, it is clear 
that at the time he was arrested, there was no evidence that Alston was under a present threat, that is, it 
was not an imminent threat.”). 
 23. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 66 (1651); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *4; THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For a general 
discussion of the right to self-preservation as modified by the Second Amendment, see Nelson Lund, 
The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 
(1987). 
 24. See supra notes 20–22. 
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conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”25 John Locke called it 
“reasonable and just I should have a Right to destroy that which threatens 
me with Destruction.”26 Sir William Blackstone concluded that, “Self-
Defence, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is 
not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.”27 And 
Alexander Hamilton, most relevant to the facts of Gomez’s case, stated: 
“If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then 
no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense 
which is paramount to all positive forms of government.”28 
B. Justification Under United States Common Law 
Obviously, there is a great deal of space between Hobbes’s “doing any 
thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be 
the aptest means thereunto” and laws prohibiting ex-felons from 
possessing firearms for self-defense. Likewise, the way that federal courts 
of appeals have so far applied the justification defense to violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) is much more circumscribed than the natural right of self-
preservation. The circuits that allow a justification defense29 use elements 
tests that generally require a defendant to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he “(1) reasonably feared death or serious injury from an 
imminent threat, (2) [did] not recklessly place[] himself in the path of that 
threat, (3) had no reasonable alternative to possession, (4) reasonably 
believed that possession would avert the threat and (5) maintained 
 
 
 25. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 66 (1651) (“And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule 
of Reason, “That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and 
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.” The first 
branch, of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, ‘To seek 
Peace, and follow it.’ The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, ‘By all means we can, 
to defend our selves.’”). 
 26.  John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 296–97 
(P. Laslett rev. ed., 1960). See also id. at 289 (“Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not 
to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition 
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on 
an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, 
Health, Limb or Goods of another.”).  
 27. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4. 
 28. THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 29. All but the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have allowed a justification defense. See United 
States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 403 (4th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). The Eighth Circuit has 
suggested that it would follow the elements used by the Fifth Circuit in an appropriate case. United 
States v. Poe, 442 F.3d 1101, 1103 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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possession only as long as necessary to avoid the threat.”30 The Courts of 
Appeals have made clear that, under such elements tests, ex-felons cannot 
choose firearms as a means of self-preservation in most circumstances.31  
For example, the Third Circuit held in United States v. Alston, that an 
ex-felon may not possess a firearm to pass through an area where a death 
threat was made against him by a man who had previously shot the ex-
felon and against whom the ex-felon had testified in court.32 The Alston 
court pointed to the Seventh Circuit’s explanation that “only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances, illustrated by United States v. Gomez, where 
the defendant had sought protection from the authorities without success, 
will the [justification] defense entitle the ex-felon to arm himself in 
advance of the crisis merely because he fears, however sincerely and 
reasonably, that he is in serious danger of deadly harm.”33 The Alston 
court concluded that, “[t]o hold otherwise would immunize a convicted 
felon from prosecution for carrying a firearm solely based on a legitimate 
fear for life or limb.”34 The Seventh Circuit has summarized the 
circumscribed nature of the common law justification defense to felon-in-
possession laws, stating: “The defense of necessity will rarely lie in a 
felon-in-possession case unless the ex-felon, not being engaged in criminal 
activity, does nothing more than grab a gun with which he or another is 
being threatened.”35 Thus, the Courts of Appeals have interposed space 
between an ex-felon’s natural right of self-preservation and the common 
law defense of justification, excusing this space as the standard burden of 
 
 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 733 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 2013). This formulation varies 
somewhat from circuit to circuit. For example, the Fifth Circuit considers whether the defendant 
recklessly or negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation, whereas the Sixth Circuit only 
considers recklessness. Compare United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998), with 
Moore, 733 F.3d at 174. Another example variation: the Fifth Circuit appears to let the first four 
elements dictate the permissible length of possession, as opposed to adding a separate element like the 
Sixth Circuit does. Compare Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 873, with Moore, 733 F.3d at 174. 
 31. See supra note 19. 
 32. United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 95–96 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 33. Id. at 97 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 34. Id. at 96. The Seventh Circuit explains in greater detail:  
If ex-felons who feel endangered can carry guns, felon-in-possession laws will be dead 
letters. Upon release from prison most felons return to their accustomed haunts. Even those 
who go straight will in all likelihood continue to live in dangerous neighborhoods and consort 
with some dangerous people. Many of them will not go straight, but will return to dangerous 
activities such as the drug trade. Every drug dealer has a well-grounded fear of being robbed 
or assaulted, so that if Perez’s defense were accepted felon-in-possession laws would as a 
practical matter not apply to drug dealers. 
Perez, 86 F.3d at 737. 
 35. Id. 
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proving an affirmative defense under the common law, bolstered by 
deference to the expressed intent of Congress.36  
C. Truncating the Right to Self-Preservation 
It is questionable that the space between the right of self-preservation 
and the defense of justification should be so wide. This note considers the 
possibility that the Courts of Appeals, by leading the way in narrowly 
interpreting the justification exception to felon-in-possession laws (thus 
removing it farther from circumstances where self-preservation rights 
would normally apply), have perpetrated an injustice upon ex-felons, or at 
least upon those who are trying to go straight but continue to live in 
dangerous neighborhoods where law enforcement cannot significantly 
reduce the occurrence of violent crime. On the one hand, the Third Circuit 
suggests that a person should not have to relocate out of fear and notes that 
economic or family circumstances may foreclose relocation as an option.37 
On the other hand, many circuits brazenly conflate ex-felons attempting to 
“go straight” with ex-felons who are “looking for trouble,” “return[ing] to 
dangerous activities,” or “engag[ing] in criminal activity.”38 For instance, 
the Seventh Circuit argues that if ex-felons who are not engaged in 
criminal activity but do have a “well-grounded fear” of serious bodily 
injury are allowed to possess firearms for self-preservation, “felon-in-
possession laws would as a practical matter not apply to drug dealers.”39 
This reasoning ignores the likelihood that dealing illegal drugs would be 
found to constitute recklessly or negligently placing oneself in the path of 
danger, which would eliminate the possibility of using the justification 
defense under the elements tests devised by the Courts of Appeals.40 The 
Seventh Circuit provides no logically consistent reason why ex-felons who 
possessed a firearm in reasonable anticipation of danger but are not 
 
 
 36. See supra note 19. 
 37. Alston, 526 F.3d at 95 (“It may be argued that Alston should have pulled up stakes and 
moved to a location where he would be unlikely to encounter Bentley. But economic or family 
circumstances may foreclose such an option. In any event, a victim should not have to relocate because 
of fear of possible retaliation.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Perez, 86 F.3d at 737. 
 39. See Perez, 86 F.3d at 737 (“If ex-felons who feel endangered can carry guns, felon-in-
possession laws will be dead letters. Upon release from prison most felons return to their accustomed 
haunts. Even those who go straight will in all likelihood continue to live in dangerous neighborhoods 
and consort with some dangerous people. Many of them will not go straight, but will return to 
dangerous activities such as the drug trade. Every drug dealer has a well-grounded fear of being 
robbed or assaulted, so that if Perez’s defense were accepted felon-in-possession laws would as a 
practical matter not apply to drug dealers.”). 
 40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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engaged in criminal activity should be denied the opportunity to prove the 
elements of a justification defense. After all, calling the police only rarely 
stops a violent crime in progress.41 
D. Do Felon-In-Possession Laws Do More Good or Harm? 
Natural law theorists suggest that individuals who are not committing 
an offense against another person should be able to use any reasonable 
means to preserve their lives.42 But when those individuals are ex felons, 
would embracing such theories create more danger for society than they 
would alleviate? This note will take a utilitarian approach to answering 
that question. Although this note will not directly address the legal 
arguments being tested in the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller43 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,44 such an inquiry may be of some use in 
arguing for or against a government’s compelling interest in keeping ex-
felons from possessing firearms.45 This is an important issue, even aside 
 
 
 41. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2008 STATISTICAL TABLES, Table 107 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cvus08.pdf (noting that police respond to less than one-third of reported crimes of violence within five 
minutes and to less than two-thirds of reported crimes of violence within ten minutes). It may be worth 
noting some of the limitations of response time data. The BJS data referenced above comes from the 
National Crime Victimization Survey, and the recollections upon which the survey data is based could 
be inexact. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY METHODOLOGY FOR CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, 6 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cvus/cvus08mt.pdf (“Other sources of nonsampling error are related to the inability of the 
respondents to recall in detail the crimes which occurred during the six months prior to the 
interview.”). Further, the BJS data do not include information about the timing of the emergency call 
to which police were responding. If the victim could only place the call after the completion of the 
crime, and no injury occurred, then there would be no need for a rapid response time. Such results, if 
common, would cause the data to misrepresent the frequency of a speedy police response to an 
ongoing emergency. See generally Carl Bialik, Detroit Police Response Times No Guide to 
Effectiveness, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241 
27887323997004578642250518125898. However, the existence of such results, where a victim could 
only place the emergency call after the crime had already been completed, supports the argument that 
calling the police is not a sufficient alternative to protecting oneself against a well-founded fear of 
violence. 
 42. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. See also JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of 
Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 297 (P. Laslett rev. ed., 1960) (“[F]or, by the 
fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be 
preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war 
upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a 
lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common-law of reason, have no other rule, but that 
of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey . . .”). 
 43. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 44. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 45. See generally Deborah Bone, The Heller Promise Versus the Heller Reality: Will Statutes 
Prohibiting the Possession of Firearms by Ex-Felons Be Upheld After Britt v. State?, 100 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1633, 1635–38. Bone notes, “[p]rior to Heller, the original Federal Firearms Act was 
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from any federal constitutional controversy created by Heller and 
McDonald, as several states have amended their constitutions to require 
regulations of firearm possession to pass strict scrutiny.46 Missouri, for 
example, recently fought a series of legal battles over the constitutionality 
of its felon-in-possession law.47 Missouri’s experience demonstrates how 
 
 
challenged in two circuit courts under the Second Amendment, and both circuit courts upheld the 
statute on the grounds that the Second Amendment did not create an individual right to bear arms, a 
premise that the Supreme Court has since rejected.” Id. at 1635 (citing Cases v. United States, 131 
F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942); Heller, 128 S. 
Ct. 2783, 2797). Bone then quotes Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), in which the Supreme 
Court upheld felon-in-possession laws against a constitutional challenge, relying again on the 
collective right theory of the Second Amendment that Heller overruled:  
The firearm regulatory scheme at issue . . . is consonant with the concept of equal protection 
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is some rational basis 
for the statutory distinctions made . . . or . . . [if] they have some relevance to the purpose for 
which the classification is made.  
Id. at 1637 (quoting Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65). Bone concludes, “[i]n essence, Heller’s adoption of an 
individual rights theory of the Second Amendment invalidates the holding in Lewis and wipes the slate 
clean of case law directly supporting ex-felon possession restrictions—except, of course, that the 
Heller opinion calls such laws permissible.” Id. at 1637–38 (citing Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17). See 
also Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal 
Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL 437, 465–66. (2004) (“Most laws limit or restrict liberties. When the 
constitutionality of these laws is challenged, courts respond by dividing liberties into two kinds: 
fundamental and non-fundamental. Some liberties (e.g., speech) are fundamental because they are 
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. Other liberties (e.g., marriage) are fundamental because they 
are said to be ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ The constitutionality of legislation that 
restricts a fundamental liberty is subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and is evaluated by applying the onerous 
‘compelling state interest’ test. Under this test, the challenged law will be upheld only if it is necessary 
to achieve a compelling government purpose. In other words, the government’s objective must be 
essential, and the law must be the least restrictive means to attain it.”). 
 46. See 2012 La. Acts 874, § 1 (“Be it resolved by the Legislature of Louisiana, two-thirds of the 
members elected to each house concurring, that there shall be submitted to the electors of the state, for 
their approval or rejection in the manner provided by law, a proposal to amend Article I, Section 11 of 
the Constitution of Louisiana, to read as follows: . . . Any restriction on this right shall be subject to 
strict scrutiny.”); 2013 Ala. Laws 267 (“AN ACT Proposing an amendment to Article I, Section 26 of 
the Constitution of Alabama of 1901; to provide that every citizen has a fundamental right to bear arms 
and that any restriction on this right would be subject to strict scrutiny . . .”); Dotson v. Kander, 464 
S.W.3d 190, 196 (Mo. 2015) (“SJR 36 proposed the following changes to Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 
23 . . . That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and accessories typical to the 
normal function of such arms, in defense of his home, person, family and property, or when lawfully 
summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned . . . . Any restriction on these rights shall 
be subject to strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 47. See Dotson, 464 S.W.3d 190 (upholding the ballot initiative that added strict scrutiny to 
Missouri’s constitutional right to bear arms); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 816 (Mo. 2015) 
(upholding Missouri’s felon-in-possession law against a facial challenge to its constitutionality); State 
v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. 2015) (same); State v. Robinson, No. SC94936 (Mo. July 15, 
2015) (challenging felon-in-possession law as unconstitutional both facially and as applied to an 
individual with only one non-violent felony conviction from eleven years prior for unlawfully carrying 
a weapon for self-defense); State v. Lomax, No. SC94989 (Mo. Oct. 27, 2015), (challenging felon-in-
possession law as unconstitutional as applied to an individual with a long history of criminality but no 
violent felony convictions); State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. 2016) (holding that Missouri’s 
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perceptions of the justice of forbidding ex-felons from possessing firearms 
are used to bolster legal arguments in support of felon-in-possession laws. 
Missouri voters passed a ballot initiative in August 2014, amending 
article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution to declare the “right of 
every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and accessories typical 
to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home, person, 
family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power 
. . . unalienable” and that “[a]ny restriction on these rights shall be subject 
to strict scrutiny.”48 Among the exceptions included in the amendment is: 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly 
from enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent 
felons . . .”49 Subsequent to the amendment, individuals convicted of both 
violent and non-violent felonies have challenged the constitutionality of 
Missouri’s felon-in-possession law,50 arguing that it abridges a 
fundamental right without passing strict scrutiny analysis.51 The arguments 
marshaled and the data gathered by both sides in these cases aid the 
analysis of the costs and benefits of ex-felon firearm possession,52 and 
Missouri's experience on this new frontier of firearm-possession 
jurisprudence53 makes it an interesting case study as well. 
 
 
constitution does not prohibit the legislature from restricting nonviolent felons’ right to possess 
firearms); State v. Robinson, 479 S.W.3d 621 (Mo. 2016) (same); see also Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 538–
41 (Teitelman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that 
Missouri’s felon-in-possession statute is narrowly tailored, because the State’s evidence failed to show 
that permanently prohibiting nonviolent ex-felons from possessing firearms served the interest of 
public safety). 
 48. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 196 (Mo. 2015). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.070.1(1) (2014). 
 51. See supra note 47. 
 52. Such data, depending on how they are presented, are not always appreciated by courts. See, 
e.g., State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 814 n.6 (disregarding evidence that goes to the failure of 
Missouri’s felon-in-possession law to achieve its purpose because such statistics “prove nothing about 
the law’s design.”). 
 53. For examples of the legal profession grappling with the Heller and McDonald decisions, see, 
e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (looking to First Amendment 
jurisprudence and applying intermediate scrutiny to a challenged law prohibing possession of a firearm 
with a serial number removed because the law only regulated the manner of possession); Michael B. 
de Leeuw, The (New) New Judicial Federalism: State Constitutions and the Protection of the 
Individual Right to Bear Arms, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1449 (2012) (giving “an overview of the 
post-Heller/McDonald world, arguing that there is no consensus on what rights the Second 
Amendment confers and analyzing the possible scopes of the Second Amendment” and considering 
how states could confer greater individual gun rights than the constitution); Brannon P. Denning & 
Glenn H. Reynolds, Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 
(2009) (reviewing developments in lower federal courts after the Heller decision); C. Kevin Marshall, 
Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009) (discussing how 
federal felon-in-possession laws could be consistent with the Second Amendment after Heller). 
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Determining whether felon-in-possession laws are just or fair, and 
investigating the component question of whether they do more good or 
harm, is important not only for the role it may play in determining whether 
governments have a compelling interest in restricting firearm possession 
by the entire class of ex-felons, but also because society should aim to 
have just and fair laws that are interpreted in ways that do not “work 
manifest injustice.”54  
III. REASONS EX-FELONS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO POSSESS FIREARMS 
This part is largely based on the idea that those who have once been 
convicted of a felony offense have demonstrated a greater willingness to 
do wrong, and therefore cannot be trusted to possess firearms. Data do 
show a correlation between felony convictions and subsequent arrests for 
violent crimes.55 The Supreme Court of Missouri, in finding that 
Missouri’s felon-in-possession56 statute passes strict scrutiny, noted, “[i]t 
is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes 
than are other law abiding citizens”57 and “[f]urthermore, ‘someone with a 
felony conviction on his record is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in 
illegal and violent gun use.’”58  
The State of Missouri has raised similar arguments in its briefs for 
cases involving firearm possession.59 Amici in a recent Missouri case, 
 
 
 54. Courts are more likely to make exceptions to laws whose general terms “work manifest 
injustice.” See Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225–26 (1921); see also id. at 226 (“All laws should 
receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to 
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the 
legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason 
of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The common sense of man approves the 
judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, ‘that whoever drew blood 
in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,’ did not extend to the surgeon who opened 
the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, 
cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison 
shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire—‘for 
he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’”) (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 
U.S. 482, 486–87 (1869)). 
 55. Though, placing one more criminal prohibition—one that comes with a lighter penalty in 
many instances—on top of existing criminal laws seems unlikely to deter individuals who society does 
not believe can be trusted not to break the law again. See infra notes 113–17, 123 and accompanying 
text. 
 56. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.070.1(1) (2014). 
 57. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 
2011)). 
 58. Id. (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 59. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17, State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808 (Mo. 2015) (“Given 
the fact that felons have already shown a willingness to violate the law, keeping firearms out of their 
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including the City of St. Louis, further developed this argument, proffering 
studies that purportedly show that “felons, regardless of the nature of their 
prior felony, are more likely to commit future violent crimes than non-
felons.”60 First, St. Louis asserts that “[n]on-violent criminal history 
predicts violent recidivism almost as strongly as does a violent criminal 
history.”61 Next, the city contends that some “criminals with prior offenses 
are more likely to be carrying guns during their subsequent offenses.”62 St. 
Louis adds, “[h]andgun purchasers with prior misdemeanor convictions 
are at an increased risk for future criminal activity, including violent and 
firearm-related crimes.”63 Finally, St. Louis asserts, “denial of handgun 
purchase is associated with a reduction in risk for later criminal activity of 
approximately 20 to 30 percent.”64 All of these statistics, taken as 
representative and significant, suggest that society benefits from laws 
prohibiting ex-felons from possessing handguns because such laws reduce 
criminal activity and, in particular, reduce violent criminal activity. 
Whether or not the proffered studies and statistics are properly relied 
upon or convincingly support the proposition that ex-felons should not be 
allowed to possess firearms,65 a common sense argument can be made that 
firearms possessed by individuals who have previously been convicted of 
a serious criminal offense are more harmful to society than firearms 
possessed by individuals who have never been convicted of a serious 
offense.66 Arguments that ex-felons are less likely to act lawfully, having 
already demonstrated a willingness to break the law, are often supported 
 
 
hands bears a substantial relationship to the government’s function in protecting public safety.”) 
(citing United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 60. Brief of the City of St. Louis et al., amici curiae, at 13, State v. Robinson, No. SC94936 (Mo. 
July 14, 2015). 
 61. Id. at 13–14 (citing James Bonta, Karl Hanson & Moira Law, The Prediction of Criminal and 
Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
128–29 (1998)). 
 62. Id. at 14 (“The Bureau of Justice Statistics has also indicated that criminals with prior 
offenses are more likely to be carrying guns during their subsequent offenses. The Bureau reports that 
drug offenders who were recidivists were more likely to be carrying a firearm during their offense than 
first-time drug offenders (9% versus 6% of State inmates and 11% versus 5% of Federal inmates.”) 
(citing CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM USE BY OFFENDERS 6 
(2001), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fuo.pdf). 
 63. Id. at 14–15 (quoting Garen Wintemute et al., Prior Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk 
Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of 
Handguns, 280 JAMA 2083 (1998)). 
 64. Id. at 15 (quoting Mona A. Wright, Garen J. Wintemute & Frederick P. Rivara, Effectiveness 
of Denial of Handgun Purchase to Persons Believed to Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence, 89 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 88, 89 (1999). 
 65. See infra Part IV for challenges to such statistical data and its application to this issue. 
 66. See infra Part V for a discussion of how any harm to society compares to any harm to the 
individual ex-felons. 
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by recidivism statistics.67 In Missouri from 1997 to 2012, for example, 
369,448 individuals were convicted of a felony offense.68 Twenty-six 
percent of those individuals had a new conviction within five years from 
the start of probation or release from prison.69 This rate of offending is 
much higher than that of the general population.70 If ex-felons are more 
likely to commit unlawful acts, a prohibition on their possession of 
firearms seems a reasonable hedge against the risk that they may also be 
more likely to use firearms violently. 
Thus, the best arguments for prohibiting ex-felons from possessing 
firearms are the simplest. According to the statistics, their previous 
criminal conduct, whether violent or not, accurately predicts an increased 
risk of future violent activity. Mitigating that risk by establishing a 
threshold crime that allows for punishment before ex-felons take the next 
step to violently use a firearm creates a buffer of deterrence and 
incapacitation that benefits society more than it harms individuals. 
IV. REASONS EX-FELONS SHOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM 
POSSESSING FIREARMS 
Before declaring that the benefits felon-in-possession laws bring to 
society are greater than the harms they cause, those harms must also be 
tabulated. In order to make such a calculation, I will lay out some of the 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It is well-established 
that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law-abiding citizens. See, e.g., 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 at 6 (2002) (finding that within 
a population of 234,358 federal inmates released in 1994, the rates of arrest for homicides were 53 
times the national average).”). 
 68. MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON SENTENCING AND 
SENTENCING DISPARITY 2012, 40 (2014). 
 69. Id. 
 70. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports list 1,165,383 violent crimes and 8,277,829 property 
crimes reported to law enforcement agencies in 2014, when the estimate population of the United 
States was 318,857,056. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1995–2014, 
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/ 
crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).  
 This gives a rate of approximately 0.03 crimes reported per person for that year. Though 
convictions and reports are obviously different, and the crimes being counted by the Missouri 
Sentencing Advisory Commission, see supra note 68, may not be exactly the same as those being 
counted by the FBI, the gulf between crimes reported per person and recidivism rates is so vast as to 
make it safe to conclude that ex-felons are convicted at far higher rates than the general population. 
Keep in mind that there are many factors other than the actual number of illegal acts committed that 
contribute to the recidivism rate, for instance: increased police attention, the impeachment value of 
prior convictions, and the plea bargaining leverage provided by enhanced punishments for repeat 
offenders. 
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potential benefits of allowing ex-felons to possess firearms. This section 
considers the safety benefits of ex-felon firearm possession, both for the 
ex-felons themselves and for their neighborhoods. Next, it critically 
evaluates the statistics used to support the proposition that ex-felons 
should not be allowed to possess firearms. Finally, it considers ways the 
legal system already allows for firearm possession by ex-felons to 
examine the situations in which society considers such possession to be a 
small risk. 
A. Economic Problems of Ex-Felons 
The root of the problems with basing firearm possession prohibitions 
on an individual’s status as an ex-felon is economic. A recent summary of 
studies done regarding the challenges facing ex-felons upon their release 
from incarceration states: 
Felony imprisonment results in social stigma, the erosion of job 
skills, and disqualification from stable government and union jobs. 
Accordingly, former prisoners experience lower wages, slower 
wage growth, and, importantly, greater unemployment. According 
to Bruce Western, the average annual number of weeks ex-inmates 
worked dropped from thirty-five before imprisonment to twenty-
three after, and they tended to have much shorter job tenure. 
Additionally, imprisonment was related to poor employment 
continuity for many years after release. After release, offenders are 
typically shunted into secondary labor markets with little job 
security, little opportunity for advancement, and miniscule 
earnings.71 
At least partially because of these economic limitations,72 ex-felons reside 
largely in high-crime areas and experience more frequent instances of 
 
 
 71. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1050–51 (2009) (citing BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN 
AMERICA 116, 120–21, 123, 127, 412–13 (Russell Sage 2006); Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling & 
David F. Weiman, The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 410, 
412 (2001); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 32–35 (Chicago 2007); Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and 
Earnings, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 863, 864 (2006) (finding “no substantial evidence of a negative effect of 
incarceration length on employment or earnings”)). 
 72. See JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, EX-
OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET (2010). 
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violence.73 Therefore, ex-felons have a strong self-preservation motivation 
to possess firearms. More importantly, given the network of risk factors 
present in poor, high-crime neighborhoods, explanations for recidivism 
should encompass more than simply individual lawbreaking tendencies.74 
A proper calculation of the social utility of prohibiting firearm possession 
by ex-felons must account for both the experience of ex-felons as victims 
of violent crime and the factors that undermine arguments that ex-felons 
endanger society when they are permitted to possess firearms. 
Most of the social utility generated by allowing ex-felons to possess 
firearms is due to ex-felons’ ability to protect themselves and deter 
violence. Because ex-felons are increasingly concentrated in poor 
neighborhoods in our nation’s central cities,75 they face higher instances of 
both violent and nonviolent crime. According to the FBI, in 2014, just 
over half of all violent crimes reported in the United States occurred in 
cities with a population of at least 100,000 people, where less than thirty 
percent of the United States population resides.76 People who live in 
lower-income neighborhoods are not only more likely to have run-ins with 
law enforcement officers, but also they are more likely to need protection 
in the absence of law enforcement officers.77 One illustration of the 
frequency of ex-felon victimization is the struggle in states over claims 
made by ex-felons for compensation from victims’ funds.78 In Maryland, 
 
 
 73. See Christy A. Visher & Jeremy Travis, Transitions from Prison to Community: 
Understanding Individual Pathways, 29 ANN. R. SOC. 89, 102 (2003) (“Other research has shown that 
returning prisoners are increasingly concentrated in our nation’s central cities and within them, in a 
relatively small number of neighborhoods that often are characterized by severe poverty, social 
disorganization, and high crime rates.”) (citing JAMES P. LYNCH & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISONER 
REENTRY IN PERSPECTIVE, URBAN INSTITUTE (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/research/ 
publication/prisoner-reentry-perspective/view/full_report; Todd R. Clear, Dina R. Rose, Elin Waring 
& Kristen Scully, Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Examination of Concentrated 
Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 33 (2003); PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE 
IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES (Jeremy 
Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003)). 
 74. See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Incarceration and the Economic Fortunes of 
Urban Neighborhoods, in ECONOMICS AND YOUTH VIOLENCE: CRIME, DISADVANTAGE, AND 
COMMUNITY 207 (Richard Rosenthal et al. eds., 2013), discussing and citing research that reveals the 
clustered factors associated with crime and incarceration and “the reciprocal effects of crime, 
incarceration, and neighborhood social and economic disadvantage.” 
 75. Id. 
 76. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, Crime Trends by Population Group, 2013–2014, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-12 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 77. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 78. See, e.g., Gary Hunter, Maryland: Convicted Felons Receive Victims’ Compensation, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 2011, at 36. 
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for example, the chairman of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
was moved to state: “If someone with an extensive criminal background 
who has changed their life and is moving on and they happened to be the 
innocent victim of a crime, why shouldn’t that person be compensated?”79 
The co-author of a case study on Maryland’s compensation program 
noted, “[t]here is a lot of fluidity between being a victim and being a 
criminal. It’s not necessarily two distinct, separate groups of people.”80 If 
ex-felons are frequent victims of crime, there is more potential utility to be 
gained by allowing them to possess firearms for self-protection.  
Since law enforcement plainly cannot keep violent crime from 
occurring in these neighborhoods,81 residents who are concerned about 
 
 
 79. Id. Sandy A. Roberts added: “The issue is whether they were involved in a crime at the time 
they were injured, not their background.” Id. 
 80. Id.; See also LISA NEWMARK & MEGAN SCHAFFER, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, CRIME VICTIMS 
COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE (2003), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/410799-Crime-Victims-Compensation-
in-Maryland.PDF. 
 81. And, of course, government, including law enforcement, has no legal duty to protect citizens 
from private violence. Nor do citizens have a claim against the government when law enforcement 
chooses not to enforce the law to prevent violence. See Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197, 201 (1989) (“As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State’s failure 
to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due 
Process Clause. . . . Petitioners concede that the harms Joshua suffered occurred not while he was in 
the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state 
actor. While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it 
played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. That 
the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him to 
his father’s custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it 
not acted at all; the State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual’s safety by having 
once offered him shelter. Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to protect 
Joshua.”); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (“[T]he framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (the original source of § 1983), did not 
create a system by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that 
better policing might have prevented. . . .”). Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit reflects on the effect 
that ineffective police protection has on both the Second Amendment and felon-in-possession laws in 
United States v. Gomez (though it should be noted that both concurring judges refused to join in the 
footnote that included these reflections): 
In modern society, the right to armed self-defense has become attenuated as we rely almost 
exclusively on organized societal responses, such as the police, to protect us from harm. . . . 
The tradeoff becomes more dubious, however, when a citizen makes a particularized showing 
that the organs of government charged with providing that protection are unwilling or unable 
to do so. At that point, the Second Amendment might trump a statute prohibiting the 
ownership and possession of weapons that would be perfectly constitutional under ordinary 
circumstances. Allowing for a meaningful justification defense ensures that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) does not collide with the Second Amendment. 
92 F.3d 770, 774 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, 
and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117–20, 130 (1987) (“The fundamental right 
to self-preservation, together with the basic postulate of liberal theory that citizens only surrender their 
natural rights to the extent that they are recompensed with more effective political rights, requires that 
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their safety or the safekeeping of their property82 have reasons to take 
protective measures of their own.83 And many alternative protective 
measures, like “[k]eeping a dog, installing a burglar alarm, or moving to a 
neighborhood with a lower rate of crime,” are more expensive than firearm 
possession.84 Thus, private individuals undertaking to protect themselves 
by possessing firearms do good for society by deterring or preventing 
crime,85 apart from the obvious harm they can cause if an ex-felon in 
 
 
every gun control law be justified in terms of the law’s contribution to the personal security of the 
entire citizenry.”)). Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of 
the Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL 437, 482 (2004) (“The right of self-protection might not apply to 
gun possession if rates of violent crime were low, or if guns were a totally ineffective means of self-
protection. But despite enormous progress throughout the past decade, rates of violent crime in the 
United States remain the highest among Western industrialized countries.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief, at 8, State v. Robinson, No. SC94936 (Mo. Sept. 28, 2015) 
(“Respondent, Raymond Robinson, is a fifty-five-year-old single man who lives in North St. Louis 
City and requires a cane to walk as a result of a chronic hip injury. Respondent supported himself by 
doing rehabilitation work on old doors and windows for churches and residential buildings in the 
community for cash payment. Because Respondent at times carried amounts of cash on him from his 
job, he owned a handgun for personal protection.”) (citations omitted). 
 83. See Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL 437, 482 (2004) (“Guns often are a viable means of protection from 
these threats. Victims who use a gun to resist robbery or assault are less likely to be injured than those 
who use other means of self-protection or do not resist at all—even when the unlawful aggressor is 
armed. Moreover, gun ownership reduces the likelihood of being victimized in the first place. 
Convicted felons admit a fear of armed victims, and make efforts to try to avoid them. No one pretends 
that more effective law enforcement can significantly alter these facts in the foreseeable future. As 
long as the state is unable to protect innocent victims, the case for allowing gun ownership for 
purposes of self-protection becomes more plausible.”) (citing GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: 
FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 171 (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1997); JAMES WRIGHT AND 
PETER ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 
149 (Hathorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986)). 
 84. Id. at 485. Husak notes, “[a]s a result, an inchoate offense of gun possession would have its 
greatest impact on the poor. Attempts to prohibit guns would restrict the availability of an effective 
means of self-protection from low-income homeowners who are the least able to afford higher quality, 
more expensive substitutes.” Id. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text; Alston, 526 F.3d at 95 
(“It may be argued that Alston should have pulled up stakes and moved to a location where he would 
be unlikely to encounter Bentley. But economic or family circumstances may foreclose such an option. 
In any event, a victim should not have to relocate because of fear of possible retaliation.”). 
 85. The defensive use of firearms has been a contentious topic, but in 2013, the Institute of 
Medicine and the National Research Council noted: 
Almost all national survey estimates indicate that defensive gun uses by victims are at least as 
common as offensive uses by criminals, with estimates of annual uses ranging from about 
500,000 to more than 3 million (Kleck, 2001a), in the context of about 300,000 violent crimes 
involving firearms in 2008 (BJS, 2010). 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE & NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE 
THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE 15 (Alan I. Leshner et al., eds. 2013) (citing Gary 
Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use: Evidence and Disinformation, in ARMED: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON GUN CONTROL 213–84 (Gary Kleck & Don B. Kates eds., 2001)); BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 41. Further: 
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possession of a firearm decides to commit violence. Both considerations 
matter. 
However, using recidivism data to support the premise that ex-felons 
are more likely to engage in violent behavior is questionable for several 
reasons. Recidivism studies do not untangle the complex web of social and 
economic factors that connect living in impoverished, high-crime 
neighborhoods with both initial criminal activity and recidivism.86 Data 
showing a large gap in recidivism between ex-felons sentenced to 
probation and sentenced to incarceration illustrate this. In Missouri from 
1999–2014, “[t]he data shows [sic] that offenders sentenced to probation 
have lower recidivism rates than prison based sentences. After five years, 
probationers are two-thirds less likely to be later incarcerated than 
offenders released from prison, and two-thirds less likely to be convicted 
of a new offense.”87 Comparing probationers to incarcerated offenders 
with similar criminal history, probationers are up to fifteen percent less 
likely to be later incarcerated, though the gap shrinks once the criminal 
histories include previous incarceration.88 These gaps suggest that 
incarcerated individuals have a harder time avoiding criminal activity, not 
because of their tendencies, but because incarceration breaks their 
connection with their employment and community, leading to economic 
hardship which forces them to live in high-crime areas and make dubious 
economic choices, creating a vicious cycle.89 This undermines the idea that 
the violent tendencies of ex-felons justify restricting their right to possess 
firearms and suggests that solutions to recidivism and violent crime lie 
beyond the reach of the criminal law. 
More basically, supporters of broad felon-in-possession laws either 
misrepresent or misunderstand the data that purportedly confirm the utility 
of such laws. For example, in a brief filed in the Supreme Court of 
 
 
Studies that directly assessed the effect of actual defensive uses of guns (i.e., incidents in 
which a gun was “used” by the crime victim in the sense of attacking or threatening an 
offender) have found consistently lower injury rates among gun-using crime victims 
compared with victims who used other self-protective strategies (Kleck, 1988; Kleck and 
DeLone, 1993; Southwick, 2000; Tark and Kleck, 2004). 
Id. (citing Gary Kleck, Crime-Control Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 1 (1988); Gary Kleck & Miriam A. DeLone, Victim Resistance and Offender Weapon 
Effects in Robbery, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 55 (1993); Lawrence Southwick, Self-Defense 
with Guns—The Consequences, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 351 (2000); Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting 
Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861 (2004)). 
 86. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 87. MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON SENTENCING AND 
SENTENCING DISPARITY 2014, 51 (2015), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=93233. 
 88. Id. at 52. 
 89. See also supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
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Missouri in State v. Robinson, amici including the City of St. Louis 
attempt to argue that all felons, whether violent or non-violent, have a 
higher propensity to commit violent crime, which justifies broad felon-in-
possession laws.90 The amici state, “[n]on-violent criminal history predicts 
violent recidivism almost as strongly as does a violent criminal history.”91 
The amici somehow missed that, in support of this statement, they were 
citing to a study entitled “The Prediction of Criminal and Violent 
Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis,”92 
in which seventy percent of the offenders analyzed had been diagnosed 
with schizophrenia.93 Data collected using a sample of mentally disordered 
individuals cannot say anything about the whole population of individuals 
with criminal history and therefore cannot support the amici’s 
proposition.94  
The Robinson amici compound their error by citing other studies 
focusing on narrow, unrepresentative populations, as well as studies using 
only anecdotal evidence.95 The amici also cite a study of handgun 
purchasers in California to support their assertion that even a criminal 
history including a non-violent misdemeanor was enough to make a 
subsequent arrest for a violent offense five times more likely.96 This study 
 
 
 90. Brief of the City of St. Louis et al., amici curiae, at 13, State v. Robinson, No. SC94936 (Mo. 
July 14, 2015) [hereinafter Amici Brief]. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 13–14 (citing James Bonta, Karl Hanson & Moira Law, The Prediction of Criminal and 
Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
128–29 (1998)) (emphasis added). 
 93. Bonta et al., supra note 92, at 126–27. 
 94. See MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 271–72 (3d ed. 
2015) (“The objective of random sampling is to be able to draw valid statistical inferences about 
properties or parameters of the population from which the sample is drawn. . . . Without the probability 
space generated by the random sampling procedure it becomes impossible, or at best speculative, to 
assign quantitative statements about the reliability of inferences based on the sample.”). For a brief 
summary of the flawed presentation of statistical evidence by the State of Missouri in a series of cases 
challenging the constitutionality of Missouri’s felon in possession law, see State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 
531, 540 (Mo. 2016) (Teitelman, J., dissenting).  
 95. Amici Brief, supra note 90, at 14 (citing CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM USE BY OFFENDERS, 1, 6 (2001), http://bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fuo.pdf; Michael Luo, Felons Finding It Easy to Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/us/felons-finding-it-easy-to-regain-gun-rights.html). 
 96. Id. at 14–15 (citing Garen Wintemute et al., Prior Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor 
for Later Violent and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Handguns, 
280 JAMA 2083 (1998)). The study counts arrests as “new criminal activity” because that approach 
“is common in criminological research.” Wintemute et al., supra, at 2086. While studies trying to 
quantify all crime may want to account for crimes that are not noticed or not solved, this study is 
trying to link firearm purchases by specific individuals to crime committed by specific individuals. 
Using arrests in this scenario, rather than convictions, is entirely speculative. There is a much larger 
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has two flaws in addition to being a non-representative sample: 
(1) approximately one-eighth of their study population had their prior 
criminal records purged by the State of California, which the authors noted 
“injects a level of uncertainty into [their] final findings that cannot be 
completely quantified,”97 and (2) the study could not identify which 
violent crimes involved firearms.98 With all of these shortcomings, the 
study does not say anything about whether criminal history affects firearm 
crime and cannot say anything about how society is affected by various 
types of ex-felons being permitted to possess firearms.99 The dissenting 
judge in Robinson concluded,“[t]he lack of even rudimentary scientific 
rigor leaves the State to rely on what amounts to assumptions, conjecture, 
and ‘common sense’ unmoored by relevant, established facts.”100 All 
together, these studies suggest that ex-felons with mental disorders should 
be kept from possessing firearms for society’s sake, but they say nothing 
else quantifiable about the costs and benefits for American society of ex-
felon possession of firearms. 
B. Legal Theories that Support Ex-Felon Possession of Firearms 
There are also several legal theories in American jurisprudence that 
suggest reasons why ex-felons should not be prohibited from possessing 
firearms. Most notably, almost all federal circuit courts have accepted, or 
at least acknowledged, the existence of justification defenses to 
prosecutions under the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922.101 This implies that, at least in some circumstances when necessity 
 
 
universe of people outside the study who could have alternatively committed—or even been convicted 
of—the crimes for which the studied individuals were arrested. 
 97. Wintemute et al., supra note 96, at 2086. 
 98. Id. at 2084. 
 99. See supra note 94. 
 100. State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 540 (Mo. 2016) (Teitelman, J., dissenting); see also State v. 
Robinson, 479 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Mo. 2016) (Teitelman, J., dissenting) (noting that Judge Teitelman 
published his dissent for Robinson and the cases decided concurrently in State v. Clay). 
 101. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United States v. Podlog, 35 
F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Perrin, 45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 515 U.S. 1126 (1995); United States v. Panter, 688 
F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Singleton (6th Cir. 1990), 902 F.2d 471, cert. denied 498 
U.S. 872 (1990); United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rice, 214 
F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Poe, 442 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2006) (indicating 
that, although Eighth Circuit has never recognized justification as defense to violation of 18 USCS 
§ 922(g), if such defense were available, it would follow the Fifth Circuit’s articulation of elements of 
defense). 
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or duress is great,102 the need of an individual to possess a firearm can 
outweigh the government purpose to promote public safety.103 Congress 
also acknowledged that some ex-felons do not warrant full dispossession 
when it created the exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).104 Presumably, 
the felony offenses Congress chose to exempt do not indicate a risk of 
future violence that is significant enough to justify this specific restriction 
of the freedom of the ex-felons convicted of such offenses. It would then 
follow that ex-felons who have committed any felony offense that could 
be shown to indicate a similarly insignificant risk of future violence would 
also merit exceptions to felon-in-possession laws.105 
One (perhaps novel) argument is based on courts sentencing 
individuals convicted of violent felony offenses to a term of probation.106 
For instance, nationally, seven percent of convicted murderers and twenty-
eight percent of those convicted of aggravated assault were sentenced to 
 
 
 102. “Traditionally, in order for the necessity defense to apply, the coercion must have had its 
source in the physical forces of nature. The duress defense was applicable when the defendant’s acts 
were coerced by a human force. This distinction served to separate the two similar defenses. But 
modern courts have tended to blur the distinction between duress and necessity.” United States v. 
Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, 
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 50, at 383 (1972)). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1982) (“We do not believe that 
Congress intended to make exfelons helpless targets for assassins. The right to defend oneself from a 
deadly attack is fundamental.”). 
 104. “(20) The term ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ does not 
include—(A) any . . . offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of 
trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or (B) any State offense 
classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two 
years or less.” Also, see generally Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun 
Possession by Nonviolent Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 120–21 (2013). 
 105. See, e.g., C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 695, 728, 730–31 (2009) (“In applying all of this history (or lack thereof) to arms disabilities for 
felons, the first line—between a justified and unjustified disability—should be between ‘crimes of 
violence’ and other felonies. Such a distinction is not merely based on the UFAs, FFA, and related 
history from the 1920s and 1930s, although that history merits some weight for its own sake as the first 
time the question of felon disarmament was considered. Rather, the ‘crime of violence’ concept 
developed then tracks, both historically and rationally, the basis on which a disability should proceed 
constitutionally: by focusing on convictions indicating that one actually poses some danger of 
physically harming others rather than simply being dishonest or otherwise unsavory. . . . But absent 
conviction for some ‘crime of violence,’ wherever exactly that line lies, it is difficult to see how the 
Second Amendment could allow a convict to be disabled from keeping or bearing arms. Historically, 
such a prohibition lacks support before the 1960s. Rationally, there does not seem to be even a 
legitimate state interest in disarming someone like Martha Stewart, apart from increasing her 
punishment; yet simple vindictiveness is hard to accept as sufficient ground for stripping someone of a 
constitutional right.”). 
 106. Individuals in this situation test the boundary between the classes “felon” and “ex-felon.” 
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probation.107 “Nineteen percent [of convicted violent felons in the most 
populous seventy-five counties] received a probation term without 
incarceration.”108 In Missouri from 2007–2012, 1.2% of 570 people 
convicted of second-degree murder (A felony) under § 565.021 RSMo, 
54.5% of 3,046 people convicted of second-degree assault (C felony) 
under § 565.060 RSMo, and 63.0% of 3,027 people convicted of second-
degree domestic assault (C felony) under § 565.073 RSMo were sentenced 
to probation.109 The fact that all of these convicted violent felons, 
including some murderers, can be trusted to remain free and respect the 
conditions of their probation, including obeying felon-in-possession laws, 
suggests that courts do not perceive an especially high risk of violent re-
offense among a substantial segment of the convicted felon population. 
One final consideration before attempting to tally the costs and benefits 
of felon-in-possession laws: some of those convicted of felony offenses 
are innocent of the crimes for which they were found guilty.110 Restricting 
the rights of the wrongfully convicted can only cause harm, unless the 
individual was otherwise predisposed to violence and happens to be 
deterred by the prohibition he is now subject to, or unless the process of 
being convicted and punished can cause an individual to gain violent 
tendencies that are kept in check by felon-in-possession laws. 
V. UTILITARIAN CALCULUS 
The utilitarian calculus attempted in this note will be based on a 
general ethical principal that morally good acts are “those acts whose 
consequences tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of 
individuals.”111 When considering prohibitions of ex-felon firearm 
possession, then, the relevant positive consequences are the amount of 
harm prevented by such laws and the number of people for whom harm 
 
 
 107. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 
2004—STATISTICAL TABLES, 1.2 (2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs 
04102tab.cfm. 
 108. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT FELONS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES 1 (2006), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vfluc.pdf. 
 109. MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON SENTENCING AND 
SENTENCING DISPARITY 2012, 40 (2014), http://doc.mo.gov/Documents/MOSAC-Annual-Report-
2014.pdf. 
 110. See, e.g., the list of cases at http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/. 
 111. See Charles Camic, The Utilitarians Revisited, 85 AM. J. SOC. 516, 520 (1979). For a 
discussion of how Camic arrived at this “distinguishing feature of utilitarian moral philosophers,” see 
id. at 519–20. 
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has been prevented.112 When considering allowing ex-felons to possess 
firearms, the relevant positive consequences are similarly the amount of 
harm prevented by such possession and the number of people for whom 
harm has been prevented by such possession.  
The biggest challenge is that both numbers are likely to be very 
small.113 Felon-in-possession laws do not proscribe or punish harm itself, 
but instead attempt to avert the possibility of harm.114 This means that 
actual harm will materialize in only a fraction of the instances in which an 
ex-felon would be subject to punishment for unlawfully possessing a 
firearm.115 The calculation is further complicated by the fact that all ex-
felons who are correctly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm 
have demonstrated that they are not deterred by the potential for 
punishment.116 And “[t]he persons who pose the greatest risk of gun 
violence are probably those who will go to the greatest lengths to 
circumvent the law and obtain a gun despite whatever legal machinery is 
 
 
 112. Subjective benefits such as psychological comfort are even more difficult to calculate than 
the instances of physical harm this note attempts to estimate, so they are not considered, either for 
potential victims of firearm crime or for those ex-felons whose personal well-being is increased just by 
knowing they possess a firearm. See Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the 
Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL 437, 477 n.126 (2004) (“Some utilitarian 
disadvantages of attempts to proscribe guns are very hard to calculate.”). Similarly, the one-time effect 
on individuals’ psychological well-being that repeal or amendment of felon-in-possession laws might 
cause is not considered. Readers are welcome to speculate and add to this calculus. Douglas Husak 
gives a perfect example of the difficulty in weighing subjective considerations: 
Moreover, empirical data about the need or efficacy of guns for self-protection may not be all 
that matter. Most persons who keep guns in the home report that they feel safer from crime. 
Possession of a gun reduces the sense of helplessness and increases the perception of 
individual control. Perhaps these feelings of security should be discounted if they were based 
on misinformation. Respondents typically overestimate their likelihood of being victimized, 
and thus adopt greater precautions than would be recommended on the basis of empirical 
evidence. But many Americans remain paralyzed by their fears of violent crime. Anything 
that makes them feel less vulnerable has some value. 
Id. at 483. 
 113. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL 437, 476 (2004) (“Perhaps the most worrisome feature of statutory 
schemes to prohibit gun or drug possession is the willingness to use the criminal law to prevent the 
risk of harm, even though that harm would materialize in only a tiny fraction of the cases in which 
persons are subject to punishment. The net of criminal liability is deliberately cast far and wide to 
catch enormous numbers of offenders, fully aware that only a small percentage of those who are 
punished would ever have caused the harm to be prevented.”). 
 114. Id. at 438–40 (“These offenses do not proscribe harm itself, but rather the possibility of 
harm—a possibility that need not (and typically does not) materialize when the offense is committed”). 
 115. Id. at 476. 
 116. See id. at 448–49 (“Even if this regulatory scheme were tightened, however, we could be sure 
that countless guns would continue to find their way into the wrong hands. Relatively few gun-using 
criminals bought their weapons, either from licensed dealers or on the black market. About half report 
that they stole their gun, borrowed it, or received it in a trade or as a gift.”).  
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designed to prevent them from doing so.”117 The instances where felon-in-
possession laws can be counted as preventing harm, then, are those where 
someone was deterred from causing harm by the increased risk of simple 
possession or those where someone who was intending to cause harm with 
a firearm is caught in possession before causing harm and thereby 
prevented or deterred from causing that harm.  
There are also relevant negative consequences to consider. Prohibition 
entails punishment, and so every conviction under a felon-in-possession 
statute must be tallied up as harm caused.118 Some of the harm caused by 
conviction and punishment will be cancelled out by the harm that was 
prevented by incapacitating a violent ex-felon with a firearm before that 
individual could make use of the firearm, but some individuals who would 
not have caused harm will also be swept up by the law.119 Likewise, ex-
felon firearm possession can have negative consequences beyond those 
that felon-in-possession laws seek to prevent. For instance, firearms used 
improperly can harm rather than protect innocent victims.120 The question 
again is whether the harm prevented plus the good produced is greater than 
the harm generated minus the good foregone. 
All of these calculations are especially difficult to make because of the 
limited data available on ex-felons and their place in American society. As 
one group of researchers summarized the problem: 
 
 
 117. Id. at 449. 
 118. Many of these convictions will result in punishing someone who did not intend to cause any 
harm, either because they only possessed the firearm for self-protection, or because they had already 
caused the intended harm and were caught in unlawful possession too late. Though, in the second case, 
concurrent sentencing would result in no harm caused by the felon-in-possession statute. See also 
Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 
23 L. & PHIL 437, 476 (2004) (“Perhaps the most worrisome feature of statutory schemes to prohibit 
gun or drug possession is the willingness to use the criminal law to prevent the risk of harm, even 
though that harm would materialize in only a tiny fraction of the cases in which persons are subject to 
punishment. The net of criminal liability is deliberately cast far and wide to catch enormous numbers 
of offenders, fully aware that only a small percentage of those who are punished would ever have 
caused the harm to be prevented. Of course, all inchoate offenses sweep widely. Only some of those 
who conspire to kill, for example will actually succeed in bringing about a death. If we concede (as we 
must) that the criminal law may be invoked to prevent harm before it occurs, we are certain to punish 
persons for conduct that would not, in fact, have resulted in harm.”). 
 119. Id. at 477–78 (“Recall that our present strategy is selective rather than comprehensive; it 
endeavors to reduce the risk of harm by trying to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous persons. No 
efforts are made to ensure that given individuals are indeed dangerous before they are barred from 
owning guns. Instead persons are disqualified on actuarial grounds—that is, because of their 
membership in designated groups. The difficulty with this approach is evident. Most (and perhaps all) 
of the disqualified groups contain significant numbers of members who are not dangerous, and whose 
gun ownership would not create a substantial risk of harm—at least, no greater than that of the average 
person.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Arthur Kellermann & Donald Reay, Protection or Peril: An Analysis of Firearm-
Related Deaths in the Home, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557 (1986). 
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For more than 200 years, prisons have occupied a prominent place 
in the criminal justice system. Over the past 30 years, America has 
significantly expanded the uses of prisons, with the result that the 
incarceration experience now penetrates deeply into the fabric of 
American life. Yet remarkably little is known about the impact of 
imprisonment on the individuals who are sent there or the 
concentric circles of family, peer groups, neighborhoods, and the 
larger society that are affected by our imprisonment policies.121 
Better data, especially on the locations where ex-felons reside, their 
experiences as victims of crime, and their perpetration of violent crimes 
would help with this calculation immensely. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It seems more likely that felon-in-possession laws lead to net disutility, 
as some individuals are severely negatively impacted, and the benefits of 
prohibition only accrue in marginal cases, largely because possession laws 
are difficult to enforce before a violent event has occurred and those intent 
on violence are the least likely to be deterred by one more layer of 
illegality. There are alternatives, though, that may shift the balance of 
utility back to a net positive for felon-in-possession laws. 
The first alternative would be to broaden the justification defense to 
felon-in-possession laws. Courts can permit ex-felons with a reasonable, 
ongoing fear of serious violence who cannot afford to move away from the 
threat to possess firearms to the extent required for self-preservation. 
Those ex-felons who have returned to criminal activity would be unable to 
avail themselves of the justification defense because their criminal activity 
would violate the elements of the defense, which do not permit recklessly 
putting oneself in the path of danger.122 But courts would no longer 
consign ex-felons to defenselessness on top of all the other struggles they 
face upon their release from incarceration. The benefits to those ex-felons 
attempting to go straight are obvious. They can now feel safer and defend 
themselves if necessary, and armed ex-felons would contribute a deterrent 
effect on crime in their neighborhoods. The harms to society from 
expanding the justification defense would include any cases of accidental 
misuse of those firearms that would not have occurred otherwise, likely a 
 
 
 121. Christy A. Visher & Jeremy Travis, Transitions from Prison to Community: Understanding 
Individual Pathways, 29 ANN. R. SOC. 89, 106 (2003). 
 122. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
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minor consideration. Even more marginal is the potential for those ex-
felons involved in criminal activity to get away with illegal possession 
because of the expanded justification defense.123  
Another alternative is to more narrowly tailor felon-in-possession laws. 
This was the approach federal law took from 1938 until 1961.124 Federal 
law already exempts those convicted of a short list of non-violent 
crimes,125 and there are many similar, non-violent offenses (in the ever-
growing list of regulatory crimes that now carry potential penalties in 
excess of one year) that could be included.126 Legislatures could even 
refine the firearm disability, based on, for example, whether the ex-felon 
lived in a dangerous area where police were unable to prevent violence, 
whether the ex-felon had shown any signs of violence or poor decision 
making in the past, whether the ex-felon had mental health issues, or 
whether the ex-felon avoided violating parole or probation terms set by the 
court.127 
Though it seems that felon-in-possession laws are in many ways 
overbroad and likely to cause harm while doing only marginal good, this 
conclusion is far from clear, and the main proposed takeaway from this 
attempt to estimate a utilitarian moral determination regarding felon-in-
possession laws is the continued need for more information on ex-felons 
and their reintegration into American society.128 With a large and growing 
population of ex-felons in the United States,129 the justice or injustice 
 
 
 123. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 695, 734 (2009) (“A would-be recidivist always faces the deterrence of the punishment for his 
next underlying crime, including enhanced punishment if he uses a gun. If that does not deter him, he 
probably would not obey the preventive arms disability, so this issue is already at the margins.”) 
 124. Compare Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250 (1938) (prohibiting 
possession of firearms by those convicted of a “crime of violence,” defined as “murder, manslaughter, 
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking, assault with intent to kill, commit rape, or rob; 
assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year.”), with An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. 
No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961) (barring any person convicted of a crime punishable by more than a 
year in prison from possessing any firearm). See generally C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha 
Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009) (examining the history of felon-in-
possession laws). 
 125. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 126. See, e.g., State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 540 (Mo. 2016) (Teitelman, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the long and growing list of nonviolent and impersonal regulatory felonies, including 
price-fixing, “disclosing the name or address of contributors to the Missouri National Guard Trust 
Fund,” failing to fill out a federal tax withholding form, and betting on a horse race while outside the 
enclosure of a licensed horse racing track). 
 127. Legislatures could also empower courts or boards to make such determinations. 
 128. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 129. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LIFETIME 
LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON (1997); Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the 
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caused by felon-in-possession laws will be a question of increasing 
importance that the nation should try to get right.  
 
 
U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 1948 to 2010, http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
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